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Abstract. Despite all attempts to prevent fraud, it continues to be a major threat to industry and government. 
Traditionally, organizations have focused on fraud prevention rather than detection, to combat fraud. In this 
paper we present a role mining inspired approach to represent user behaviour in Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) systems, primarily aimed at detecting opportunities to commit fraud or potentially suspicious activities. 
We have adapted an approach which uses set theory to create transaction profiles based on analysis of user 
activity records. Based on these transaction profiles, we propose a set of (1) anomaly types to detect 
potentially suspicious user behaviour, and (2) scenarios to identify inadequate segregation of duties in an ERP 
environment. In addition, we present two algorithms to construct a directed acyclic graph to represent 
relationships between transaction profiles. Experiments were conducted using a real dataset obtained from a 
teaching environment and a demonstration dataset, both using SAP R/3, presently the predominant ERP 
system. The results of this empirical research demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.  
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Fraud costs the Australian economy up to 3 billion 
dollars each year (Standards Australia 2008). Not only is 
the financial loss a great concern, fraud also means reduced 
macroeconomic outcomes. Yet, many businesses today are 
ill-prepared to detect and prevent fraud, with many having 
made little or no progress in developing any form of 
effective fraud control strategy (Standards Australia 2008). 
Although numerous high-end data mining tools 
incorporating fraud detection capabilities are available 
(Mohay et al. 2003), they only detect certain types of 
frauds; their capabilities are usually limited since the 
detection relies on simple, built-in rules defined by domain 
experts. Fraud examiners and auditors require scripting 
skills and an understanding of the underlying data mining 
functions to conduct effective audits.   
As significant advances in technology emerge, more 
and more organizations are now adopting ERP systems, 
with most of the Fortune 1000 firms having installed ERP 
systems to run their businesses (Bingi et al. 1999). An ERP 
system is a packaged software solution that aims to 
automate and integrate the core business processes of an 
organization. Whilst ERP systems provide numerous 
benefits to organizations, due to their nature they are 
vulnerable to many internal and external threats (Little and 
Best 2003).  
Since the advent of ERP systems in the 1990s, 
researchers have primarily focused on fraud prevention 
rather than fraud detection. Many recent publications have 
discussed fraud prevention approaches such as role-based 
access control, segregation of duties, encryption, username 
and passwords, etc. (Huang et al. 2008; Vaidya et al. 2008; 
Albrecht et al. 2009). Although many organizations employ 
fraud prevention techniques, these only prevent simple 
kinds of fraud from occurring and are not enough on their 
own (Bolton and Hand 2002). Complex instances of fraud 
built over time, involving various applications, are difficult 
to prevent. Nevertheless only a few publications deal with 
fraud detection approaches in ERP systems (Cahill et al. 
2002; Best et al. 2009). Another driver for better fraud 
detection particularly in ERP systems, is the shift towards 
service oriented architectures. These architectures allow a 
higher degree of automation of business processes, which 
may lead to more cases of fraud as the number of human 
checks are reduced and the number of entry points into the 
  
system are increased. 
Typically, auditors and fraud examiners review audit 
logs to detect fraud in ERP systems, a labor-intensive task 
requiring time, effort and resources (Wells 2008). In order 
to conduct effective audits, they need to have a good 
understanding of the business, ERP software and its 
features. According to the ACFE report to the nation (2006), 
most frauds are detected by tip or by accident. Generally 
fraudsters start by stealing smaller amounts, but if not 
detected early, they continue to steal larger and larger 
amounts. Also fraud detection is a continuously evolving 
discipline; as detection strategies are learned and therefore 
circumvented more easily by fraudsters, early detection is 
extremely critical. While regular audits are conducted 
generally once every financial year, fraud will only be 
detected towards the end of the year. In fact, according to 
the KPMG fraud survey (2006), the average time to detect 
fraud is 18 months.  
The cost of financial fraud and its pervasive long-term 
impact is enormous. Organizations that have suffered fraud 
not only bear the direct cost of the fraud itself but also the 
indirect costs of investigating and preventing fraud from 
reoccurring. Victim organizations lose investor and 
consumer confidence and in many cases are unable to 
recover the losses. The typical organization loses 7% of its 
annual revenue to fraud (ACFE 2008) and according to a 
recent survey, as many as 42% of organizations recover 
none of their losses after discovering fraud (ACFE 2006). If 
a cost benefit analysis is done, the cost of not employing 
any fraud detection measures potentially outweighs the cost 
of the fraud detection system. Therefore it is not only 
prudent but critical that fraud detection measures form an 
essential component of both the risk mitigation strategy and 
the overall business strategy of the organization. The 
proposed system assists in mitigating the risk of financial 
fraud and aims to protect stakeholders such as shareholders, 
customers, suppliers and banks from the implications of 
fraud. 
ERP systems typically use a form of role based access 
control which can assist in the segregation of duties to 
reduce the opportunities to commit fraud. Many researchers 
have discussed the use of role mining techniques to 
automatically identify roles from existing permissions 
assigned to users within an organization (Sandhu et al. 
1996; Kuhlmann et al. 2003; Schlegelmilch and Steffens 
2005; Vaidya et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2007). Our current 
work has been motivated by role mining techniques, 
adapted to identify transaction profiles and so detect 
suspicious activities or anomalies and violations in 
segregation of duties with respect to the activities actually 
performed by users. We have also developed a graphical 
representation depicting the relationships between 
transaction profiles. The intention is to identify activity 
which may be indicative of financial fraud. The key 
contributions of this article are:  
(i) A novel and simple fraud detection approach: 
Many current fraud detection approaches employ 
techniques and algorithms that are complex and difficult to 
comprehend such as neural networks and support vector 
machines. In this article, we propose a new and simple 
approach which focuses on the set of all transaction types 
performed by an individual user to detect potentially 
fraudulent activities. Each unique set of activities used to 
profile a user, over a period of time is called a transaction 
profile. Our approach is inspired by role mining approaches 
and so far, to our knowledge has never been used to detect 
fraud. 
(ii) An automated and efficient fraud detection 
approach: Auditors and fraud examiners generally review 
audit logs to identify fraudulent transactions. With 
potentially billions of records especially in large 
organizations, reviewing audit records manually is a labor 
intensive and tedious task requiring time, effort and 
resources. Generally the legitimate transactions far 
outnumber the fraudulent ones; making them more difficult 
to identify, for example: in a dataset consisting of some 12 
billion transactions per year, approximately 10 million or 
one in every 1,200 transactions turn out to be fraudulent 
(Hassibi 2000). On the other hand, whilst commercial fraud 
detection packages are automated and efficient, auditors 
require scripting capabilities and an understanding of the 
data mining functions to conduct effective audits. 
In this work, we propose an automated and efficient 
fraud detection approach which automatically generates a 
list of the most interesting or potentially suspicious 
activities to help focus the auditor’s attention on a relatively 
small number of significant records. Automated fraud 
detection approaches provide a possibility of real time 
fraud detection which can be conducted continuously 
therefore identifying frauds as soon as they are perpetrated 
and reducing the overall financial losses and time to detect 
fraud.  
(iii) Potentially detect previously unforeseen 
fraudulent activities: Most current approaches detect 
certain types of frauds that are known or specific to a 
particular field. Typically these frauds or activities are 
defined using built-in rules developed by domain experts. 
We propose a novel unsupervised approach which flags 
both known and unknown types of activities that represent 
anomalies or potentially suspicious behavior and are of 
interest to auditors. Our proposed approach does not rely on 
classification or identification of fraudulent and/or non-
fraudulent transactions in historical datasets. 
(iv) Fraud detection context or application area: 
Most fraud detection research has been applied to and 
classified into three main areas: health care, including 
  
medical insurance, credit card and telecommunications. In 
this work, we present a fraud detection approach for ERP 
systems. Fraud detection research has virtually never been 
applied to the context of ERP systems and in particular, to 
detect anomalies. 
This article extends our work discussed in Khan et al. 
(2009). The next section articulates the related work in the 
area of fraud detection, role mining and anomaly detection.  
The article follows with a discussion of the proposed 
approach, using transaction profiles, in Section 3. An 
illustration of the proposed scenarios for identifying 
inadequate segregation of duties and of anomaly types for 
detecting anomalous behavior are presented in Sections 3.1 
and 3.2 respectively. Next, the generation and 
implementation of a directed acyclic graph, showing 
relationships between transaction profiles is explained with 
the help of an example in Section 3.2.1. The experiments 
and a discussion of the results are presented in Section 4.  
The article concludes with a brief description on the current 
work and future directions. 
 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
Role mining approaches generate roles from existing 
permissions assigned to users. We have adapted a role 
mining approach for generating transaction profiles from 
the user activities recorded in an ERP system. We have 
derived a set of anomaly types that flag potentially 
suspicious activities from these transaction profiles. We 
also detect scenarios that identify violations in proper 
segregation of duties from the transaction profiles, based on 
the principles presented in Little and Best (2003). The next 
subsections discuss the related work in the literature. 
 
2.1 Fraud Detection 
 
Since financial frauds involving Enron, HIH and 
WorldCom, there is increasing legislative pressure on 
organizations of all sizes to adopt proactive fraud detection 
techniques. Fraud detection refers to the activity of 
proactively searching for or finding the indicators (also 
called symptoms or red flags) that suggest that fraud may 
be occurring (Albrecht et al. 2006). 
Many organizations choose not to publicize their 
losses from financial fraud or even the fact that they have 
suffered some kind of fraud. This is mainly because they 
might lose the trust and confidence of their customers, 
investors and suppliers. Even if organizations do publicize 
their losses from financial frauds, they may not choose to 
share their detection strategies - as fraudsters might use this 
knowledge to develop fraud techniques which avoid 
detection. Although literature on major financial frauds and 
yearly facts and figures on the total losses from financial 
frauds are available, detailed descriptions of detection 
techniques are not available.  
Essentially, fraud detection approaches have been 
categorized into supervised, unsupervised or hybrid (that is,  
a combination of both the supervised and unsupervised 
approaches) (Bolton and Hand 2002). Supervised methods 
can only detect previously known or existing fraud cases 
and are unable to detect novel fraud attacks. Samples of 
both fraudulent and non-fraudulent patterns are required to 
construct models in order to assign observations into one of 
the two classes. Supervised methods have the problem of 
unbalanced class sizes, that is, the legitimate transactions 
far outnumber the fraudulent ones and this imbalance can 
cause misspecification of models (Bolton and Hand 2002). 
Examples of rule-based algorithms that use supervised 
methods include RIPPER (Cohen 1995) and C4.5 (Quinlan 
1993). 
Unsupervised methods do not require prior knowledge 
of fraud cases, they try to establish profiles of normal 
behaviour and any deviations from the profile are 
considered to indicate possibly fraudulent behavior. 
Observations most dissimilar to the norm are more likely to 
be fraudulent and anomalous, and can then be examined 
more closely. Unsupervised fraud detection methods have 
been researched in the detection of computer intrusion 
(typically employing profiling and anomaly detection 
techniques – discussed further in Section 2.3). In this paper, 
we propose an unsupervised fraud detection approach (see 
Section 3).  
Link analysis and visualization techniques have gained 
popularity among fraud investigators (Cox et al. 1997). 
Link analysis explores the inherent relationships between a 
principal and other data represented within the dataset, 
using visualization, record linkage and social network 
methods. With the aid of powerful visualization tools such 
as i2 and Netmap, analyzing patterns and relationships in 
large datasets, with potentially billions of records, have also 
become more effective. 
After reviewing over 50 published papers on fraud 
detection, over a period of ten years, Phua et al. conclude 
that only seven studies claim the implementation of a fraud 
detection system (Phua et al. 2005). Table 1 shows a 
summary of the seven studies including their application 
area, classification method, technique employed and a brief 
description of the approach. Our approach is most similar 
to Cortes et al. (2003) and Cox et al. (1997) as they have 
used graph structures to represent data, in order to detect 
potentially suspicious behavior.    
Most fraud detection research has been applied in the 
context of health care, credit card or telecommunications 
fraud. Only a few studies have discussed fraud detection 
approaches in the context of ERP systems. Best et al.(2009) 
  
Table 1: Summary of the 7 studies which have implemented a fraud detection system 
 
propose a supervised methodology in which ERP security 
logs are extracted and analyzed to flag users who have 
performed a critical combination of transaction codes. The 
flagged records are then further examined by checking 
additional information from other system tables to 
determine whether a fraud has actually occurred (Best et al. 
2009).  
 
2.2 Role Mining and Segregation of Duties 
 
Segregation of duty policies reduce the opportunities 
for fraud by ensuring that the separate transactions making 
up a sensitive combination of transactions, must be invoked 
by separate people (Kuhn 1997; Sandhu et al. 1999). If, for 
example, an individual has privileges to both authorize and 
execute transactions, it is possible for them to commit and 
cover fraud in their normal course of duties. Effective 
internal control structures require such privileges to be 
segregated at various levels within an organization. 
Weaknesses in segregation controls are common and often 
provide opportunities for fraud (KPMG 2006). Numerous 
guidelines and principles for the separation of duties have 
been proposed in the literature to prevent fraud (Srinidhi 
1994; Haelst and Jansen 1997; Arens and Loebbecke 2000; 
Little and Best 2003). 
In an ERP system, where hundreds or thousands of 
users may be performing activities, the only way to 
segregate duties is to assign roles and authorizations to 
users which would prevent any one of them from 
performing incompatible combinations of transactions 
(Little and Best 2003). When so many ERP system users 
must be assigned their own individual access permissions, 
role engineering saves significant time and money while 
protecting data and systems (Coyne and Davis 2007). Role 
engineering is the process of identifying a set of roles that 
is complete and correct and to do so in an efficient manner 
(Coyne 1996). Synonyms of role engineering include role 
discovery, role finding and role characterization. 
Essentially there are two main approaches to role 
engineering: (i) the top-down approach and (ii) the bottom-
up approach. Some authors have also discussed a 
combination of the two approaches, called a hybrid 
approach (Schaad et al. 2001).  
In the top-down approach, business processes are 
carefully examined to identify job functions and their 
associated roles. Top-down approaches are mainly adopted 
by small enterprises where there are no existing roles or 
permissions assigned to individuals (Martin et al. 2003). 
Though the approach identifies groups of users who 
perform similar activities accurately, it is a costly, time 
consuming and tedious process to understand the semantics 
of the business processes especially in large organizations 
with millions of authorizations and thousands of users 
(Vaidya et al. 2008). Detecting financial fraud is a labor-
intensive task requiring time, effort and resources for 
internal and external auditors, and having to perform role 








A five-layer knowledge/statistical based system which 
compares each observation with other similar 
observations. 




A fuzzy system which derives clusters and then 
identifies patterns using a classification approach. 
(Dorronsoro 
et al. 1997) Credit card Unsupervised 
Neural 
network 
Use the nonlinear discriminant analysis neural model to 
separate fraudulent operations away from other similar 
to normal traffic. 
(Ghosh and 
Reilly 1994) Credit card Supervised 
Neural 
network 
A three-layer feed forward Radial Basis Function 
(RBF)-based neural network is used to create a fraud 
score for each new observation. 







Use graph theory to visually determine communities of 
interest to detect call patterns among groups of 
customers. 
(Cahill et al. 
2002) 
Telecomm-
unications Hybrid Event driven 
Each call is given an average suspicion score according 
to the extent to which it deviates from the normal 
signature and resembles the fraudulent signature. 
(Cox et al. 
1997) 
Telecomm-
unications Unsupervised Visualization 
Graphical displays (showing relevance by color, size 
and position) of calls between subscribers in different 
geographical locations. 
  
mining using this approach would further extend the 
manual audit processes. 
On the other hand, the bottom-up approaches derive 
roles from existing permissions assigned to users, with 
minimal human intervention. Most studies in the literature 
have proposed bottom-up role mining techniques as they 
automate the process of role discovery and are therefore 
more cost effective (Zhang et al. 2007). This approach is 
not likely to consider the business functions within an 
organization (Shin et al. 2003). 
Schlegelmilch and Steffens (2005) present a bottom-
up approach which uses hierarchical clustering to create a 
hierarchical tree of permissions and users which can be 
used to derive roles. Their algorithm first computes for 
each permission the number of users who have that 
permission and groups these users together in a cluster. In 
this initial step, each different permission is in its own 
cluster, meaning that each user may be a member of 
multiple clusters. Pairs of clusters are combined based on 
the maximal overlap of their user sets. Newly formed 
clusters contain the permissions of their child clusters and 
the set of users from the child clusters who have all 
permissions in this new cluster. The algorithm stops when 
no more clusters can be combined or when all permissions 
are combined into one root node. The algorithm does not 
derive roles, but a tree with users and permissions, although 
is the authors include a discussion on manually deriving 
roles from the tree.  
Another bottom up approach, proposed by Vaidya et al. 
(2006) uses subset enumeration to derive roles from 
existing permissions. The algorithm intersects all possible 
combinations of permissions to derive roles. It starts by 
considering existing permissions assigned to users as roles, 
called initial roles. The intersections of these roles are then 
used to generate more roles, called generated roles. Further 
intersections of generated and initial roles are carried out 
until no new roles are generated (Vaidya et al. 2006). Our 
implementation of this algorithm discovered that an 
enormous number of roles are generated, and not 
surprisingly, that some of these were not allocated to any 
users. We believe that this approach would be impractical 
and time consuming for an auditor to use to detect 
anomalous activities.  
Compared to Vaidya et al. (2006) and Schlegelmilch 
and Steffens (2005) work, our approach is more similar to 
Schlegelmilch and Steffens (2005). In their study they have 
suggested roles that are derived from existing permissions 
assigned to users. While in our approach we use subset-
superset relationships to derive transaction profiles from 
the activities actually performed by users (see Section 3 for 
details).  
 
2.3 Anomaly Detection and User Profiling 
 
There has been a vast amount of literature published in 
the past 20 years on intrusion detection, a field of computer 
security that deals with computer and network attacks. 
Misuse or signature detection tries to identify known or 
encoded attacks in the form of a pattern and constantly 
monitors the system for the occurrence of these patterns, 
for example, frequent changes to a payroll file or attempts 
to read a password file. Examples of misuse detection in 
audit trails include state transition analysis (Ilgun et al. 
1995) and Coloured Petri Nets (Kumar et al. 1994).  
Typical anomaly detection systems profile the regular 
(also called standard or normal) behavior of a user, 
generally referred to as the profiling phase, and any 
deviation from this standard behavior, known as the 
detection phase, is indicated as a possible intrusion or 
anomaly (Lu et al. 2006). Once the deviations or anomalies 
are identified, the system generates an alert. Anomaly 
detection models can be capable of adjusting their detectors 
to keep up with the changes in user behavior to accurately 
detect suspicious behaviour (McCue 2007). They are also 
capable of detecting novel attacks but are expensive in 
terms of overhead, as they keep track of profiles and 
updates (Kruegel and Vigna 2003) and sometimes identify 
unusual but legitimate behavior as malicious, therefore 
generating a high rate of false alarms. Anomaly-based 
intrusion detection systems are derived from Denning’s 
(1987) original model. Denning developed an intrusion-
detection system that gathered information from various 
audit logs/records to create historical profiles for users. 
These profiles are then compared with normal user activity 
and anomaly records are generated for deviations found. 
Activity logs were maintained to track actions if particular 
conditions were met and could also be used for updating 
profiles and generating reports (Denning 1987).  
Statistical techniques have been commonly used for 
anomaly detection, for example, the Next-generation 
Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES) which 
monitors real-time activities of users by calculating various 
statistics. New observations are then correlated with the 
calculated profiles to flag any deviations (Valdes and 
Anderson 1994). Classification techniques along with 
association rules and frequent episode programs have been 
used by Lee and Stolfo (1998) to automatically detect 
anomalies in audit data. These data mining techniques are 
used to find patterns of system features that describe 
program and user behavior and a set of relevant system 
features are used to compute classifiers that identify 
anomalies (Lee and Stolfo 1998). 
The use of neural networks for anomaly detection has 
also been popular. Ryan et al. (1997) used back propagation 
neural networks in a Unix environment, to construct user 
  
profiles based on the type and frequency of commands 
performed. The system detects anomalies offline on daily 
logs, based on previously observed behavior (Ryan et al. 
1998). Ju and Vardi (2001) used a Markov model to profile 
command sequences of each user. Their approach compares 
a user's command sequence to the users and others' 
estimated signature behaviors in real time, to detect 
anomalies (Ju and Vardi 2001). Some investigators have 
used clustering (k-means or other) approaches for 
preprocessing or reducing the data before applying Hidden 
Markov models for anomaly detection (Lane and Brodley 
2003). Often clustering algorithms are applied on their own 
to detect anomalous behavior. Oh and Lee (2003) detect 
anomalies in audit trail data by profiling the transactions 
executed by the users. They propose a method of clustering 
the activities of transactions generated by a user and detect 
anomalies based on each users’ profiles (Oh and Lee 2003).  
More recently, graph based approaches to detect 
anomalous activities have also been discussed. Graphical 
methods have been used to detect insider threats in business 
processes or scenarios such as document control and 
management systems (Eberle and Holder 2009). Likewise, 
our approach detects anomalous transaction types from 
audit data by generating a collection of directed acyclic 
graphs. 
In the next section, we propose an approach which 
builds user profiles based on the types of transactions 
performed by the user recorded in the audit log. Similar to 
(Ryan et al. 1998), our approach operates offline and does 
not consider the sequence of commands performed. 
 
 
3. TRANSACTION PROFILES 
 
In this section we discuss our three main contributions. 
We have adapted a role mining approach for deriving 
transaction profiles. We use the term transaction profile 
(TP) to denote a set of distinct transaction types that one or 
more users have performed. A transaction profile may be 
associated with one or many users and each user is 
associated with exactly one transaction profile. Our work 
uses information recorded in security audit logs which 
record the transactions performed by the users of the 
system. ERP systems generally have role based control 
over which transactions a user is allowed to perform. Users 
are assigned one or many roles and they are allowed to 
perform any transactions in those roles, but different 
policies may mandate only one role at a time.  
Problems can occur when a user changes their job 
function or is promoted, meaning that they are assigned a 
new role or set of roles. Often their previous roles are not 
revoked (Schlegelmilch and Steffens 2005). This 
accumulation of roles cannot be avoided in some cases 
when an organization has only a small number of 
employees and these employees must take on many roles. 
Often in small organizations role segregation is difficult 
and users have more permissions than they require (Little 
and Best 2003). These situations can provide the 
opportunity for fraudulent activities when a user has access 
to roles that allow them to carry out all transactions 
required for those fraudulent activities. As an example, a 
user may have the necessary role permissions to create a 
vendor and to create orders and invoices for that vendor. 
Even though a user has access to all transactions in 
their assigned roles, they may not use all of them. 
Therefore, two users who have the same roles assigned in 
the system may have quite different transaction profiles 
based on the transactions that they actually use. In our work, 
we ignore roles and focus on the actual transactions that 
users perform as recorded in the ERP security audit logs.  
We now describe our approach to detecting transaction 
profiles which represent potential fraud situations; 
situations which represent inadequate segregation of duties 
or user activity which is anomalous.  
 
3.1 Detecting Inadequate Segregation of Duties 
 
We aim to detect users whose transaction profile 
contains conflicting or incompatible transactions that 
violate the principles of segregation of duties. We 
implement and test our approach using the theoretical 
framework for separation of duties presented by Little and 
Best (2003). They propose the following set of seven 
principles for General Ledger (GL), Accounts Receivable 
(AR) and Accounts Payable (AP) applications of an ERP 
system: 
(i) Users who are given the authorizations to create and edit 
master records should not be able to enter transactions.  
(ii) Credit management activities and master record 
maintenance should be separate in AR.  
(iii) Credit management and dunning (i.e. the process of 
collecting overdue receivables from customers) functions 
must be segregated from invoice and receipt data entry.  
(iv) Receipt data entry should be separate from credit 
memo and invoice data entry.  
(v) In AP, cheques and payments must be performed by 
someone who is not entering vendor invoices.  
(vi) Writing off AR as a bad debt must be segregated from 
receipt data entry.  
(vii) User activities between GL, AP and AR should not 
cross boundaries. 
We detect scenarios based on these principles to 
identify inadequate segregation of duties from transaction 
profiles discovered by processing the security audit log. 
The idea is to identify users whose transaction profiles have 
provided the opportunity to commit fraud. 
  
3.2 Detecting Anomalous Activities 
 
We also aim to detect users whose transaction profiles 
are anomalous when compared to other users, based on 
differences in transaction profiles discovered from 
processing the security audit log. We use the following 
types and notation: 
 
u : a user identifier 
t : a transaction type 
tp : a user transaction profile – a set of transaction 
types 
ug : the set of users associated with a particular tp 
UG : the set of all ugs 
U : the user set - the set of all user identifiers 
TP : the set of all unique tps 
 
We now describe three of the anomaly types which we 
aim to identify. 
Anomaly Type 1. The idea behind this anomaly type is to 
detect a small group of users who behave slightly 
differently to a large group of users by performing some 
small number of additional transaction types. The number 
of additional transaction types used to detect this anomaly 
type is set as a threshold value, ∆trans, e.g. three extra 
transaction types, and the difference in the number of users 
with the two transaction profiles is likewise set as some 
threshold, ∆users, e.g., the small group could be one-tenth 
of the number of users in the large group. The detection of 
transaction profiles of interest tpi can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
Find tpi ∈ TP, st ∀ tpj ∈ TP,  
tpi ≠ tpj  ∧   
tpj ⊆ tpi  ∧   
|ugi| < |ugj|/∆users  ∧   
|tpi| - |tpj| < ∆trans (1) 
 
Anomaly Type 2. We aim to detect transaction profiles 
which have a large number of transactions that are being 
performed by a small number of users. For example: users 
may have accumulated many roles over the course of their 
employment in an organization. The number of users can 
be set with some threshold value, ∆users and the number of 
transactions can be set with another threshold value, ∆trans. 
These transaction profiles may represent the administrators 
of the system which would mean that the transaction 
profiles are not anomalous. The user threshold value could 
be set based on the known number of system administrators 
to reduce the number of false positives. This can be 
expressed as follows (note that the thresholds ∆users and 
∆trans have a different significance here than in Anomaly 
Type 1): 
 
Find tpi ∈ TP st  
|ugi| < ∆users  ∧ 
|tpi| > ∆trans   (2) 
 
Anomaly Type 3. A third type of anomaly is proposed 
which will detect transaction profiles that are completely 
separate from all other transaction profiles i.e. transaction 
profiles where none of the transaction types in the 
transaction profile can be found in any other transaction 
profile. Users having these transaction profiles could be 
interesting to locate, simply because they share no 
transaction types with other users. The number of users 
with such a transaction profile is expected to be low. 
 
Find tpi ∈ TP, st ∀ tpk ∈ TP, 
tpi ≠ tpk ∧  
tpi ∩ tpk = { }    (3) 
 
Discussion. It may be noticed that detection of these 
anomaly types relies on set relations between transaction 
profiles. The transaction profiles of interest in Anomaly 
Type 1 have a transaction set which is a slight superset of a 
transaction profile which is used by a large number of users. 
Anomaly Type 2 may arise because the set of transactions 
in the transaction profile of interest is the superset of 
transaction sets of multiple other transaction profiles. 
Anomaly Type 3 may occur when the transaction profile 
has a unique transaction set i.e. the transaction profile has 
no transaction supersets or subsets. 
We propose to use a directed acyclic graph of 
transaction profiles to represent the subset – superset 
relationships. Directed edges connect transaction profiles 
from a parent vertex to a child vertex where the transaction 
type set in the parent is a proper subset of those in the child. 
A graph built from transaction profiles may have multiple 
roots. These root vertices will be transaction profiles with 
unique transaction sets, probably with a small number of 
transactions. Internal and leaf vertices in the graph may 
have one or many parent vertices. There may be vertices in 
the graph which are not connected at all and these will 
relate to Anomaly Type 3 above. 
When the graph has been built, it can be traversed to 
detect the anomaly types discussed above and flag possibly 
fraudulent transaction profiles and their users. We suggest 
that it is necessary to have security log data from a system 
for a long period of time in order to reduce the number of 
false positives that the anomaly types may generate. 
  
3.2.1 Generating the Transaction Profile Graph 
 
Our approach uses set theory to profile user activities 
recorded in ERP security audit log files. Given a set of 
users and transaction types, in an ERP security log, our 
algorithm progresses in three phases as follows: 
(1) User-transaction mapping: We firstly traverse the ERP 
security audit log, to map users to a set of transaction types 
that they have performed. For each user, a user-to-
transaction type set mapping is generated.  
 
Algorithm 1. Transaction profile generation  
1. TP ← { } 
2. UG ←{ } 
3. for each ui ∈ U do 
4.  tpi ← get_tp(ui) 
5.  if tpi ∈ TP then 
6.      ugi ← get_ug(tpi) 
7.      ugi ← ugi ∪ ui 
8.  else 
9.      TP ← TP ∪ tpi 
10.      ugi ← {ui} 
11.  end if 
12. end for 
 
(2) Transaction profile generation: We next generate a set, 
TP, of unique transaction profiles from the user-to-
transaction type set mappings, ui → tpi. Each distinct set of 
transaction types represents a transaction profile, tpi. Users 
who have the same transaction profile are grouped into a 
set ugi, associated with that transaction profile. We have a 
mapping from users to their transaction profiles: 
get_tp : u → tp 
and a mapping from transaction profiles to the set of users 
associated with that transaction profile: 
get_ug : tp → ug. 
The process of generating transaction profiles is presented 
in Algorithm 1. 
(3) Deriving the transaction profile graph: A directed 
acyclic graph, G, is generated by this phase of the 
algorithm which has a set of directed edges, E, and a set of 
vertices, V, which represent the transaction profiles 
generated in Phase 2. A directed edge is connected from 
one transaction profile to another if the transaction set of 
the former is a proper subset of the transaction set of the 
latter. The final graph has a further restriction that a 
transaction profile will not have direct edges to a vertex 
which is a descendant of one of its children as these are 
redundant. The process of deriving the directed acyclic 
graph is presented in Algorithm 2. 
The graph is initialized with a special null transaction 
profile, tpØ, which has an empty transaction set (Steps 1 to 
3 of Algorithm 2). This root vertex therefore acts as a 
parent for all transaction profile vertices that are added to 
the graph because it is a proper subset of all other 
transaction profiles and is present only for simplifying 
graph generation. This root vertex is ignored in all further 
calculations once the graph has been generated. 
The remainder of the transaction profiles are added to 
the graph in order of the cardinality of the transaction set, 
|tpi|, in the transaction profile. Each transaction profile is 
tested to determine if transaction profiles currently in the 
graph have transaction sets that are proper subsets of the 
current transaction profile’s transaction set. If the subset 
relationship is discovered, an edge from the parent 
transaction profile in the graph to the current child 
transaction profile is added to the set of edges (Steps 4 to 
13 of Algorithm 2). Once a full pass of transaction profiles 
has been made, redundant edges as mentioned above are 
removed. This is achieved by starting at the leaves of the 
graph and moving back to the root vertex of the graph 
checking for such edges (Steps 14 to 24 of Algorithm 2). 
There are more efficient algorithms in the literature for 
determining subset enumeration (Haixun et al. 2006) but 
our approach runs in polynomial time, O(n3). 
Algorithm 2. Deriving the transaction profile graph 
Require: TP from Algorithm 1 
1. G = (V, E)  
2. V ← {tpØ} 
3. E ← { } 
4. for x = 1 to max(|tpi|) do   
5.     for each tpi ∈ TP| |tpi| = x    
6.         for each tpg ∈ V 
7.           if tpg ⊆ tpi  then  
8.           E ← E ∪ (tpg, tpi)   
9.            end if 
10.       end for 
11.       V ← V ∪ tpi   
12.      end for 
13. end for 
14. for x = max (|tpi|) to 1 do 
15.     for each tpi ∈ V| |tpi| = x  
16.         for each tpj ∈ V| tpi ⊆ tpj    
17.           for each tpg ∈ V| tpg ≠ tpi ∧ tpg ≠ tpj         
18.     if tpg ⊆ tpj ∧ tpg ⊆ tpi then   
19.       E ← E - (tpg, tpj)   
20.                end if 
21.               end for 
22.           end for 
23.      end for 
24. end for                  
 
An example. Suppose the ERP security audit log of an 
organization consists of six users (u1…u6) each of whom 
have executed a subset of five transactions (t1…t5) during a 
  
certain period of time. In Phase 1 of our approach, a user-
to-transaction type set mapping is generated for each user 
(see Table 2). Each distinct set of transaction types 
represents a transaction profile. It can be observed from 
Table 2 that users u1 and u4 perform the exact same set of 
transactions, meaning that they will belong to the same 
transaction profile. Table 3 shows the transaction profiles, 
tp and ug generated by Phase 2 of our approach. We then 
add transaction profiles as vertices in the graph based on 
the relationship between the sets of transaction types in the 
transaction profiles. 
 
Table 2: User transaction mapping. 
 
U T 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 
u1 0 0 1 0 0 
u2 0 0 0 1 0 
u3 0 0 1 1 0 
u4 0 0 1 0 0 
u5 1 0 1 0 0 
u6 0 1 0 0 1 
 
Table 3: Transaction profiles and user sets. 
 
Transaction 
profiles tp ug 
tp1 {t3} {u1, u4} 
tp2 {t4} {u2} 
tp3 {t3, t4} {u3} 
tp4 {t1, t3} {u5} 
tp5 {t2, t5} {u6} 
 
As tp1 and tp2 have the lowest number of transaction 
types in this example, they become the root vertices 
(depicted in Figure 1). We then continue to work through 
the remaining transaction profiles. Transaction profile tp3 
has transactions t3 and t4, making tp3 a child vertex of tp1 
and tp2. As transaction profile tp5 does not have any 
transaction types that have subset-superset relationships 
with transaction types in other profiles, it is represented as 
an isolated vertex. The remainder of the vertex 
relationships can be seen in the final graph generated by 











This section describes the experiments conducted to 
validate the proposed approach. Two different datasets have 
been extracted from ERP systems to detect anomalies and 
inadequate segregation of duties. In the following 
subsections we describe the datasets, implementation and 




Data from ERP systems, more specifically SAP R/3 
systems was extracted for evaluating the approach. SAP 
R/3 is an integrated ERP system which offers modules for 
the various business functions in an organization. It has its 
own set of master records and configuration tables. Each 
user needs to enter a client number, a username and a 
password while logging on to the SAP system. After 
successfully logging in, each user accesses the same main 
menu for accounting, logistics, human resources as well as 
the security administration and configuration functions.  
User roles and authorizations restrict user access to 
individual functions (which are identified using transaction 
codes) (Best 2006). Typically a transaction code comprises 
four or more alphanumeric characters that uniquely identify 
an activity. For example the transaction code to create a 
vendor invoice is represented as FB601. A user can only log 
on if a user master record with a password for that user has 
been created in the system. The scope of activity of each 
user in the system is defined in the user master record by 
one or many roles. The user authorizations, roles, type and 
personal data such as the address are recorded in the user 
master record (SAP 2007). 
The security audit logs are stored in a binary format 
and can most easily be extracted using the reporting facility. 
Filters are used to define which events may be recorded in 
the logs. Information is only recorded in the audit files if 
the audit logs are turned on. An extract from the SAP R/3 
security audit log is depicted in Table 4. It contains fields 
for the date and time of the user activity, client identifier, 
user identifier, transaction code, terminal name, message 
number and message text. The message number and 
message text fields of the log provide more details about 
the transaction performed.  
Some activities in the SAP system do not have specific 
transaction codes, such as logon and logoff. These activities 
are represented by ‘session_manager’ or the absence of a 
transaction code. These particular transaction codes on their 
own do not add any value to a transaction profile and 
therefore have been excluded from our experiments. Their  
                                                     
1
 Note that this transaction code is not always unique. 
 
(tp2 = {t4}) (tp1 = {t3}) 
(tp3 = {t3, t4}) (tp4= {t1, t3}) (tp5 = {t2, t5})  
  
Table 4: Extract from SAP R/3 security audit log. 
 
 
inclusion to build richer transaction profiles with other 
information stored in system tables and/or the security audit 
logs, such as in (Best et al. 2009), is currently being studied 
and will be addressed in the future work, discussed in 
Section 5. Table 5 shows a summary of the datasets, 
excluding transactions ‘session_manager’ and those with 
no transaction code, and the users associated with only 
these two transaction types.  
The two different datasets that have been extracted 
from the SAP system for evaluating our approach are: (i) a 
dataset hosted by our university for teaching purposes and 
(ii) a demonstration or training dataset used for testing the 
different business functions within an organization. Dataset 
1 consists of 60,988 records of real activities performed by 
administrators, instructors and students over a period of 12 
months. Student activities are based on tutorial exercises 
conducted during two semesters. Amongst the 490 users in 
Dataset 1, only 202 users had transaction codes recorded 
against their names. These 202 users have executed 584 
different types of transactions (shown in Table 5). On the 
other hand, Dataset 2 is a demonstration environment that 
is accessible to SAP customers from different organizations 
for learning and training on the SAP system. It consists of 
304,126 records performed by 106 users. Only 39 users had 
transaction codes recorded against their names. Data was 
extracted over a period of 6 days in which users performed 
183 different types of transactions. 
 















1 University dataset 60,988 
12 
months 202 584 
2 Demonstrat
-ion dataset 304,126 6 days 39 183 
 
As Datasets 1 and 2 are extracted from student and 
demonstration systems, any anomaly types or inadequate 
segregation of duties scenarios identified do not represent 
fraudulent behavior. However, we consider these datasets 




Algorithms 1 and 2 have been implemented in Java 
and the results of the experiments are stored in a MySQL 
database. Figure 2 describes the implementation process of 
the proposed approach. The security audit log, user master 
record and the transaction types table are exported to text 
files from the options available in the SAP R/3 system’s 
user interface. All user activities are recorded in the 
security audit log, even when a user fails to logon to the 
system due to a mistyped username. A user can only log on 
successfully if a user master record for that particular user 















Figure 2: Implementation of the approach. 
 
recorded in the log. A list of all valid transaction types in 
the system is stored in an SAP table and can be used to 
cleanse the transactions recorded in data set to ensure only 
meaningful information is being analyzed. In the first step, 
the audit log file is filtered to exclude invalid user ids and 
transaction types by checking if the user name exists in the 
user master record and the transaction type exists in the 
table. This filtration does not exclude: (1) users who have 
attempted to logon with a valid user id and an invalid 
password and (2) users who have attempted to perform a 
legitimate transaction that they do not have access to. 
To protect the confidentiality of the users, the 
username and the terminal identifier fields of the log are 
anonymized. The filtered and anonymized text file is then 
used as input to Algorithm 1. For each user in the text file, 
a user-to-transaction type set mapping is generated to create 
Date Time Cl. User Transaction code Terminal MNo Text 
17.03.2008 11:54:32 600 233-063 EC01 fitgp-s623-206 AU3 Transaction EC01 Started 
17.03.2008 11:54:32 600 233-063 EC01 fitgp-s623-206 AUW Report RSECOP01 Started 
17.03.2008 11:54:32 600 233-002 FB50 fitgp-s527-017 AU3 Transaction FB50 Started 
 
  
transaction profiles, which are required as input for 
Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 then builds a directed acyclic 
graph based on the subset relationships between these 
transaction profiles. The parent-child vertex information 
from the directed acyclic graph is then stored in the 
database (depicted in Figure 2). Alerts or red flags are 
identified by running a set of SQL queries constructed for 
the various anomaly types and scenarios. The queries 
produce standard reports providing details of the red flags 
such as the transaction profiles, day and time of the activity, 
the anonymized users assigned to that transaction profile 













Figure 3: Timings for generating the user transaction 
mapping. 
 
We conducted some analysis to determine the 
experimental time complexity of Algorithm 1 and 2. In 
order to compute the time complexity of the two main 
pieces of software, we generated synthetic log data with 
different combinations of the number of users and 
transaction types. The time required to produce the user-
transaction mapping from the synthetic log was measured 
for various combinations of the number of users (between 
10 and 300, (b) transaction types (between 20 and 200) and 
records in the log (between 1 000 and 1 000 000). The 
timings were recorded on a Pentium 4 computer with 4GB 
RAM, running Windows XP using Java 6 and MySQL 













Figure 4: Timings for generating the directed acyclic graph. 
Figure 3 presents a graph of the time taken to generate 
the user-transaction mapping for the different 
configurations. It appears evident from the graph that the 
number of users (U) and the number of transaction types 
(TT) has only a minor impact on the time taken to produce 
the eventual mapping. The main impact on processing time 
is the total number of records in the log file. It can also be 
seen that the relationship between time and total number of 
transactions is almost linear, O(n).  
Figure 4 depicts the time taken to generate the directed 
acyclic graph where the number of users (U), number of 
transaction types (TT) and total number of records in the 
synthetic log were varied. This step was undertaken after 
first generating the relevant user transaction mappings for 
the data set. While the total number of transactions 
provided the main impact on the time take for generating 
the user transaction mappings, it can be seen that this is not 
the case for generating the directed acyclic graphs. It 
appears that the main impact on the generation of the graph 
is the total number of transaction types in the transaction 
log. 
 
4.3 Experimental Results 
 
Once the datasets have been filtered and anonymized 
the algorithms generate a collection of directed acyclic 
graphs which would assist an auditor in visualizing the 
different groupings of transaction profiles in the dataset. 
Each visually disaggregated graph or grouping of 
transaction profiles contains related activities. In Dataset 1, 
the processing generated 9 disaggregated graphs with a 
total of 200 distinct transaction profiles. Table 6 shows the 
9 disaggregated graphs or clusters, the depth of each graph 
and the number of transaction profiles and users in each 
graph. In order to give the reader an idea of the visual depth 
of each grouping or cluster of transaction profiles, we have 
included in Table 6 values for the number of levels in the 
graph. It can be observed that in Dataset 1 there are 4 
graphs that have one or more levels and 5 graphs with no 
 









of tp’s in 
graph 
Number 
of users in 
graph 
1 4 178 179 
1 1 2 3 
1 1 10 10 
1 1 5 5 
5 0 1 1 
 
levels i.e. these 5 graphs consist of single vertices. As a 




overlap between users in different transaction profiles. It 
can be observed from Table 6, row one, that most users, 
that is 179 out of 202 in Dataset 1 belong to related 
transaction profiles. Also, all transaction profiles have one 
user each except two transaction profiles (in row one and 
two) which have two users each.  
 









of tp’s in 
graph 
Number 
of users in 
graph 
1 1 3 3 
1 1 2 2 
1 3 11 11 
23 0 1 1 
 
In Dataset 2 the processing generated 4 disjoint graphs 
with a total of 39 distinct transaction profiles. Table 7 
shows a summary of the number of transaction profiles and 
users in each disaggregated graph. It can be observed that 
each transaction profile has only one user. As this dataset 
has fewer users and transaction types compared to Dataset 
1, there are small groupings of transaction profiles. In Table 
7, row four, it can be observed that there are 23 transaction 
profiles that do not have any connecting edges and are 
relatively different from the transaction profiles present in 
other directed acyclic graphs in Dataset 2.  
The next subsections discuss the anomaly types and 
inadequate segregation of duties scenarios detected from 
these transaction profiles. The detailed discussion and 
implication of the results are presented in Section 4.4. 
 
4.3.1 Detecting Inadequate Segregation of Duties  
 
This section describes the results of the inadequate 
segregation of duties scenarios discussed in Section 3.1. 
Segregation violations are detected using SQL queries and 
reports are generated for any matches found. Table 8 shows 
the principle number, the exact number of matches found, 
the number of transaction profiles that contain incompatible 
transaction types and the number of users assigned to those 
transaction profiles in Dataset 1.  
Principle 1 is split into (a), (b) and (c) for separation of 
transaction entry and master record maintenance for GL, 
AP and AR respectively. For Dataset 1, Table 8 shows that 
for principle 1(a) two transaction profiles, with one user 
each, have entered and posted GL transactions, and created, 
changed or deleted GL master records in the system. Most 
users (15 of them) have violated scenario 1(c), which 
detects users who have the authorizations to both maintain 
master records and post transactions in AR. From Table 8, 
(row 3) it can be observed that six users were flagged for  
Table 8: Results of detecting inadequate segregation of 













1(a) 3 2 2 
1(c) 30 15 15 
4 12 6 6 
5 1 1 1 
7 69 11 11 
 
violating scenario 4, that is, these users have entered 
receipts, and posted credit memos and/or invoices. It might 
be interesting for an auditor to investigate these users as 
they could for example substitute a credit memo for a 
receipt in order to cover a theft of cash. The processing 
detected only one user breaching scenario 5. This particular 
user had performed transactions to post an invoice and 
process payments. These transactions must be segregated 
because an employee could for example: post a fictitious 
invoice and then pay it. Most matches (69 in total) were 
generated for scenario 7 which is segregation of transaction 
types across the GL, AP and AR activities.  
Principles 1 (b), 2, 3 and 6 are not present in Table 8 
as no students have performed the incompatible set of 
transaction types present in these scenarios. For Dataset 2, 
the queries did not detect any transaction profiles which 
contain conflicting or incompatible transaction types that 
violate the principles of segregation of duties.  
 
4.3.2 Detecting Anomalies  
 
In this section, we present the results of the three 
anomaly types described in Section 3.2. The results of 
Anomaly Type 1 are dependent upon the user and 
transaction threshold values. To see the effects of the 
variable transaction threshold values, we analyze the results 
by keeping the user threshold value steady. Anomaly Type 
1 aims to detect a small group of users who have performed  
 
Table 9: Results for different transaction threshold values 








5 1 2 
15 1 5 
25 1 11 
35 1 20 
45 1 27 
55 1 30 
  
some additional transaction types compared to a large 
group of users. Table 9 shows the number of alerts 
generated for Anomaly type 1 in Dataset 1, for 6 different 
transaction threshold values and a steady user threshold 
value of 1. If the user threshold value is set to a value 
higher than 1, no alerts are generated because all 202 
transaction profiles are assigned to one user each, except 
two transaction profiles which include two users. No alerts 
are generated if the transaction threshold value is higher 
than 55 (shown in the last row of Table 9). For an auditor or 
fraud examiner, these 30 alerts are perhaps the most 
interesting or potentially suspicious due to the large 
difference in the number of transaction types performed.  
 
Table 10: A sample of results for Anomaly type 1 in Dataset 






















2 4 1 57 
2 4 1 54 
2 4 1 55 
2 4 1 50 
 
Table 10 presents a sample of the results (i.e. 4 out of 
30 alerts) when the transaction threshold value is set to 55. 
It shows the number of users and the transaction types in 
the parent and child vertex. The four transaction profiles or 
child vertices shown in Table 10 have the same transaction 
profile as their parent vertex. As this anomaly type depends 
on the number of users in each transaction profile, for 
Dataset 2, no alerts were generated as each of the 39 
transaction profiles have one user assigned to them. 
Anomaly Type 2 aims to detect transaction profiles 
which have a large number of transactions that are assigned 
to a very small number of users. Table 11 shows the 
number of alerts generated for the different transaction 
threshold values for a steady user threshold value. For Dat-  
 
Table 11: Results for different transaction threshold values 








100 2 2 
120 2 2 
140 2 2 
160 2 1 
180 2 1 
aset 1, the user threshold value was set to a value of 2 or 
less as each transaction profile consists of one or two users. 
When the transaction threshold value was set to 100, 120 or 
140, the processing generated the same two alerts, which 
include: (1) one user who has performed 194 transaction 
types and (2) a user who has performed 142 transaction 
types (shown in Table 11). When the transaction threshold 
value was set to a higher value, i.e. 160 or 180, the 
processing flagged the transaction profile with one user 
who has performed 194 transaction types.  
 
Table 12: Results of Anomaly Type 2 in Dataset 2 with a 








20 1 4 
30 1 1 
40 1 1 
    
In Dataset 2, the user threshold value was set to a 
steady value of 1 as all transaction profiles have one user 
each. As Dataset 2 (see Table 12 for results) has less users 
and transaction types when compared to Dataset 1, if the 
transaction threshold value was set to a value higher than 
40, no alerts were generated. The query generated the same 
alert when the transaction threshold value was set to 30 or 
40. This alert may represent an anomaly as no users have 
performed more than 27 transaction types, except one user 
who has performed 48 different transaction types.  
 














Dataset 1 5 2 37 
Dataset 2 23 1 25 
 
Anomaly Type 3 detects cases where the set of 
transaction types in the profile are not present in any other 
transaction profile. Table 13 shows the number of isolated 
vertices (i.e. the transaction profiles that do not have any 
edges connecting them) and the highest and lowest number 
of transaction types in a transaction profile, for both 
Datasets 1 and 2. It can be observed from Table 13 that in 
Dataset 1, the cardinality of transaction types for the 5 
isolated vertices is between 2 and 37. Similarly, in Dataset 
2 the highest number of transaction types in a profile is 25 
and these are not performed by any other user in the system. 
For both datasets, the lowest number of transaction types in 
a profile is values of 1 or 2. It might be interesting for an 
  
auditor to investigate these users as they have only 
executed one or two transaction types in the system during 
the period for which the data has been extracted.  
 
4.4 Discussion  
 
In this section we discuss the results of our processing, 
presented in Section 4.3. The inadequate segregation of 
duties framework was presented by Little and Best (2003), 
but was not implemented or tested. We implement the 
seven principles as scenarios to detect transaction profiles 
that contain incompatible transactions and thus find the 
users who are assigned these transaction profiles. Table 8 in 
Section 4.3.1, presents the results of detecting inadequate 
segregation of duties in Dataset 1.  
It can be observed that most users performed 
incompatible transactions violating scenario 1(c). Scenario 
1(c) detects users who can create and modify master 
records and also post transactions in AR. On analyzing the 
flagged transaction profiles, we found that the 15 users had 
created and/or changed AR master records and also 
performed either one or combinations of invoice, receipt 
data entry and credit management transactions. It might be 
interesting for an auditor to investigate these users as they 
could for example: create a fictitious vendor master record 
and post a fake invoice to that vendor and have the system 
pay into their our personal bank account. Most matches 
were found for scenario 7, for which 11 users in the dataset 
were flagged. These users had performed transactions in all 
three functions: GL, AR and AP. The separation of duties in 
this scenario is necessary to provide a check against AR 
and AP through GL control accounts and to properly 
authorize the offsetting transactions between AR and AP. 
The scenarios focus on detecting potentially fraudulent 
activities within the financial module of the SAP system 
and therefore the transaction types included in the scenarios 
are all related to financial activities such as changing bank 
details, creating invoices and making payments. No 
transaction profiles were flagged for violating the 
principles of segregation of duties in Dataset 2. This has 
been verified by manually checking the types of 
transactions present in the dataset. Most users in Dataset 2 
have conducted activities related to the sales and 
manufacturing module. 
For the anomaly types, the user and transaction 
threshold values depend on a number of factors such as the 
size of the organization, the size of the dataset and the 
period for which the data has been extracted. For Anomaly 
Type 1, the queries generate different number of alerts 
based on the transaction threshold value. It can be observed 
that the higher the threshold value the higher the number of 
alerts. No further alerts are generated if the transaction 
threshold value is greater than 55 (shown in the last row of 
Table 9). This implies that the maximum difference in 
number of transaction types between two transaction 
profiles is less than or equal to 55 (more details presented 
in Table 10). It might be interesting for an auditor to 
investigate why the users in the child vertices have 
performed many more transactions than the users in parent 
vertex. The 4 alerts presented in Table 10 are the extremes, 
the other 26 alerts generated from the processing are 
interesting too but the difference in the cardinality of the 
transaction profiles is less i.e. between 8 and 40 transaction 
types. Our results for Anomaly Type 1 are restricted as 
Dataset 1 has only one user in each transaction profile, 
except two transaction profiles which have two users each. 
For Anomaly Type 2, the processing generated 2 
alerts: a user who has performed 194 transaction types and 
another user who has performed 142 transaction types 
(shown in Table 11). These alerts indicate potentially 
fraudulent user behavior and have been successfully 
identified by the anomaly definition. After manual analysis 
of the dataset, we found that both these transaction profiles 
with 194 and 142 transaction types are assigned to an 
instructor and a system administrator at our university. For 
Dataset 2, Anomaly Type 2 generated an alert for a user 
who had performed 48 different transaction types. As this 
user has been flagged from the anonymized demonstration 
dataset, we were unable to manually verify the anomaly. 
Perhaps, this user might be an administrator or an instructor 
who may have tested all the training activities before the 
trainees performed them.  
For Anomaly Type 3, the results are interesting for 
both datasets. For example: for an auditor, it is interesting 
to investigate a user who has performed 37 different 
transaction types which no other user in the system has 
performed (shown in Table 13). Also, users who have 
performed only 1 or 2 transactions for the entire period are 
interesting to investigate as these users might be valid users 
who have left the organization, been on leave or perhaps 
changed their user id in the system. Or they might be 
synthetic user ids created by valid users to perform 
fraudulent activities. 
As our fraud detection approach has been tested on a 
university and demonstration dataset, any anomaly types or 
inadequate segregation of duties scenarios identified do not 
represent fraudulent behaviour, but demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the approach. The datasets do not consist 
of a real company’s operational data, but they consist of 
real users, who behave differently and perform various 
transaction types. The results and the contributions of our 
work can also be verified in practice with access to real-
operational data from an organization. Generally, in fraud 
detection research, datasets are unavailable and results are 
often confidential, making them difficult to assess (Bolton 
and Hand 2002).  
  
The current approach depends on using data from the 
ERP security audit log for detection of anomalies and 
inadequate segregation of duties. Though our approach is 
able to detect fraud performed by all types of internal users, 
it may be unable to detect frauds by administrators or 
‘super-users’. Within the SAP system, super-users have 
roles with unlimited privileges and can even edit or remove, 
audit log entries. For example, these users have the 
capability to perform fraudulent transactions and then 




5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this paper we have presented three main 
contributions:  
(1) we have adapted a role mining approach for generating  
transaction profiles from the user activities recorded in the 
security log of an ERP system, and for identifying subset 
relationships amongst such transaction profiles, 
(2) we have postulated a number of anomalous, possibly 
fraudulent, activity scenarios which can be detected using 
the transaction profiles, and we have identified such 
anomalies in our non-synthetic datasets, and 
(3) we have implemented scenarios that identify violations 
in proper segregation of duties and have detected such 
violations using the transaction profiles generated in (1). 
Our future work will focus on the detailed analysis of 
transactions involving ‘session_manager’ and transactions 
where no transaction code is listed. This may in fact be a 
rich source of further information as it provides - in the 
case of the SAP software - detailed text message 
information qualifying the transaction in some fashion. 
Furthermore we intend to incorporate frequency analysis 
into the anomaly detection. At the moment, our transaction 
profiles are based on transaction types only without regard 
for the number of times a particular type of transaction has 
been executed. This will naturally affect both the nature of 
transaction profiles and also the processing involved. It will 
provide the benefit of being able to detect much more 
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